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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

NATIONAL ADVERTISING
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
—vs.—
THE UTAH STATE KOAD COMMISSION, HENRY C. HELLAND,
Director of Highways; RALPH C.
ANDERSON, Coordinator, Outdoor
Advertising Controls, and MERCER
D. SMITH, Permit Control Officer,
Defendants-Appellants.

|
1
I
F
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> Case No. 12198
I
I
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1
]

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Road Commission of the State of Utah determined, at an administrative hearing, that one of the sign
or advertising structures maintained by Respondent, 3M
National Advertising Company, was illegal and ordered
the removal of the sign. Thereafter, Respondent brought
an action in the Third District Court seeking (1) reversal
by appeal of the decision of the Highway iCommission and
(2) independently seeking injunctive relief preventing the
removal of the sign.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWEE COURT
The statement contained in the Brief of Appellants
in this respect is essentially accurate.
-

BELIEF-SOUGHT ON APPEAL

v , The statement contained in Appellants' Brief in this
connection is essentially accurate also.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1964, National Advertising constructed and installed a sign at the quadrant of 21st South and Eedwood
Eoad. The sign faced Eedwood Eoad. (E. 98) (Photograph — Ex. 1-P). As of May, 1967, the Highway Beautification Act became effective. In approximately September of 1967, Mr. Neil Christiansen of National Advertising and Mr. Mercer Smith of the State Eoad Commission reviewed and inspected the site of the original
"Farmers" sign. (E. 99, et seq.). There were various
conversations between the gentlemen at this time regarding changing the direction of the sign, the size of the
sign, and the location of the sign. (E. 99-101; 120-23).
Subsequently, an application for a permit was filed by
National Advertising with the Utah State Department
of Highways. (See Ex. 3-P). The permit was issued.
(Ex. 3-P — It will be noted that the application bears
an endorsement as having been approved by the District
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Engineer). A new sign facing 21st South, being larger
than the previous sign, and being located some 35 feet
north of the previous sign, was constructed as of January
26, 1968. {11. 100 02). " Hie old sign \v;i: ; ti< >t removed for
approximately 60 days following the completion <n* iinnew sign due I*- muddy ground conditions at the situs "f
Mi*- uld s i g n . ^ \l

l'*-i).

The new sign, referred to as 1li«- AnuM-i^r* Oil sign,
cost approximately $5,000.00 to construct (R. I*'.'! s. and ithe subject *

r

r. l.-uir u nn contract with American n's!

Company whicJi v H < i •.• < ; n ^Vbruary of 1072 l"R. 1 * *; .
American 0 ; 1 Company pays .fl^OOO i.i«, : n-ul. *.* \ a
tional Advertising \'<>r iliis advertising space. (W

M

-^

Ultimately, the State Road ( Vmimissioi i challenged
the legality of the American Oil sign and a hearing was
held before the Road Commission. (R. 40-53). A decision
was issued in which the Road Commission found that the
sign was illegal. (R. 54-55).
There followed a series of negotiations, letters, and
further hearings culminating on J..!..

i969 in a rin.ii

decision b> the Road Commission that it would a**change its original opinion. (The exact dates and transcript references in this respect are contained in Point
I of the Brief hereinafter.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
On July 22, 1969, plaintiff filed its complaint in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of'-Utah
containing two causes of action — the first being an
appeal from the decision of the Road Commission, and
the second challenging the constitutionality of the threatened action of the Road Commission to remove the sign.
(R. 1-5). Trial was held before the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson who ruled that the appeal was not timely
but that the sign nonetheless was lawful and could not be
removed. Judge Hanson issued an injunction accordingly. (See (R. 79-84).
It is the basic position of Respondent herein that
Judge Hanson erred in determining that the appeal had
not been timely filed and Ave herewith make a crossassignment of error to that effect. It is also our position
that, regardless of the timeliness of the appeal, the sign
is yalid and the injunction should remain in effect.
u

POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
HEAR THIS APPEAL AND ERRED IN FINDING
THAT A NOTICE OF APPEAL HAD NOT BEEN
TIMELY FILED.

The state urges in its Brief (Point I) that the notice
of appeal from the decision of the Road Commission was
untimely and thus the District Court should not have
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summarily dismissed the case. To the contrary, we submit
that the record undeniably points to the conclusion that
the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter,
that the notice of appeal was timely filed, and that, in all
events, the Regulation upon which the State relies is
invalid.
(a) Road Commission Regulation 25.
A decision by the Road Commission under the Highway Beautification Act is subject to judicial review by
statute. (Utah Code Annotated, §27-12-136.9). The statute does not specify any time limit in which the appeal
must be filed. However, the Road Commission purported
to enact its own legislation on the subject which appears
in Regulation 2 5(R. 12) as follows:
"25. Notice of appeal from the Commission
decision shall be in writing, directed to the Director of Highways, postmarked or filed prior to
the 30th day from receipt of the Findings, Conclusions and Decision of the Commission."
I t is significant to note that the State here bases its ease
on Regulation 25 (see State's Brief at p. 4), and that
Judge Hanson likewise rested his decision as to the timeliness of the appeal on the same Regulation. (R. 82 —
Finding ( 1 ) ; R. 83-4 — Conclusion (1)). We believe that
there is an excellent answer to both the State and Judge
Hanson: it has been judicially determined in a final
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order of the Third District Court (Judge Emmett L.
Brown presiding) that Regulation 25 "is invalid and of
no force and effect because the Utah State Highway
Commission had no power, statutory or otherwise, to
promulgate said Regulation." (R. 21).
This matter came up in connection with a motion to
dismiss filed by the Road Commission on the same ground
which it is now urging on appeal (R. 10-11) and Judge
Brown invalidated the Regulation. No appeal has been
taken by the State from Judge Brown's order and certainly Judge Hanson had no appellate jurisdiction to
overrule Judge Brown. Thus, the Brown order is final
and unimpeachable — anything in Judge Hanson's Findings to the contrary is superfluous and the State's case
on this appeal must fail — this is the law of the case.
(b) In all events, National Advertising
fied the Road Commission of its appeal.

timely noti-

Even assuming, arguendo, that there is some applicable thirty-day time limit in which to perfect an appeal
from the Road Commission, Respondent here has met
that limit and timely filed its action in District Court.
The brevity of the State's brief, although commendable, is really somewhat misleading as to the true factual
background in connection with the timeliness of the appeal. The State merely points out—-
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(1) The decision of the Road Commission was sent
certified mail on January 20, 1969 (State's
Brief— p. 3).

(2) Plaintiff filed its action in District Court on
July 22, 1969 — well over 30 days past January
20,1969. (State's Brief — p. 4).

These harsh facts, alone, would certainly tend to support
the State's position (again assuming arguendo some legal
requirement for filing within 30 days), but the State has
simply ignored a whole host of interstitial facts which
change the picture entirely. The exact chronology, undisputed of record, i s :

(1) Regardless of when the order was in fact sent
by the Commission, plaintiff first learned of it
on March 31,1969. (R. 106).

(2) National Advertising promptly

requested an ex-

tension of time in which to appeal by letter of
April 3, 1969. (R. 37).

(3) The Road Commission granted a formal extension of time to National per its letter of April

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
8, 1969 — said extension to run to May 8, 1969.
-

(R. 36).*

(4) Prior to May 8th, 1969, a representative of National Advertising, Mr. Christiansen, had a further discussion with Ralph C. Anderson, Coordinator of Outdoor Advertising Controls for the
Road Commission. (R. 102). They discussed a
possible solution to the matter by trading off
another sign location. The matter was left open
(R. 109), and pursuant to the discussion an application to change was filed on May 13, 1969.
(R. 35). This clearly pertained to the sign here
under litigation as may be seen from the para~ graph at the bottom of the application. (See also
accompanying letter — R. 34).
(5) On June Sy1969 a letter was sent by the Road
Commission to National Advertising (R. 33) advising that the proposed trade could not be approved.

^Counsel for the State may quibble about whether the State's
letter (R. 36) is in fact an extension for time to appeal as opposed to an extension of time in which to tear the sign down.
Taken in the context of the April 3rd letter (R. 37) to which
it responds, the April 8th letter clearly grants an extension on
the appeal — note that specific reference to "appeal" time is
made in the April 3rd letter.
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(6) A letter dated June 11,1969 was sent which can
fairly be construed as a final order for removal
of the sign by June 20,1969. (R. 32).
(7) Mr. Christiansen of National again met with LeVaun Cox, Commissioner of the Road Commission, whereat Commissioner Cox indicated he
would present the sign matter to the whole Commission on July 11, 1969 at its meeting. (R. I l l ,
R. 31).
(8) A letter in the nature of a petition for reconsideration was filed by National with the Commission on July 10,1969. (R. 31).
(9) National was advised following the July 11 Commission meeting that the Commission refused to
reverse its decision. (R. 112).
(10) Suit was filed on July 22,1969. (R. 1).
Our position is quite simple — the administrative
action was never final until the Connnission meeting of
July 11,1969, when, for once and for all, the Commission
refused to reconsider or reverse its decision. The appeal
was filed promptly thereafter. It seems clear that the
time for appeal runs not from the original order but from
a denial of a petition for reconsideration. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 132 W. Va.
650, 54 S.E. 2d 169.
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I t must be remembered that we are not dealing with
a court of law where post-trial procedures have a certain
aura of formality and definiteness about them. There
are explicit and definite rules on new trial (Rule 59),
relief from judgment (Rule 60) or judgment (Rule 50).
Lawyers are familiar with these practices and the entire
procedure is predictable and definite. An administrative
agency, however, functions differently. The very purpose
of such agencies is to allow parties to iron out problems
within the scope of "administrative expertise" in a very
informal manner, without laywers in many cases, without
formal motions and rules, and without clear rules which
define the procedural aspects of the proceeding. This
Court has expressly dealt with the distinction between
administrative and judicial proceedings and has clearly
supported our contentions in this respect, In Entre Nous
Club vs. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955), the
court noted:
"The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are the
rules for the Government of the courts adjudicating formal contest between adverse parties,
U.R.C.P., Rule 1 (a) and Rule 81, Vol 9, UCA
1953; clearly they are inapplicable to a proceeding
before an administrative body seeking to regulate
activities burdened with the public interest. Differences in the parties, the experience of the hearing officer in the particular matter, the considerations involved, and the objects to be obtained
point up the need for more flexible procedure
before agencies and administrative officers than
is utilized in the trial of a case at law. Federal
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Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142-143, 60 S. Ct. 437,
84 L.Ed. 656."
Of equal importance is the doctrine of "exhaustion
of remedies" which pertains to administrative but not
judicial proceedings. In the instant situation, for example, assume that a suit was filed by National in latter
June when one of the Eoad Commissioners had indicated
that the matter would be presented for reconsideration to
the entire Commission. Had a suit been filed at that time,
it would clearly have been subject to dismissal on the
grounds that the matter was still pending before the
Commission, that it was not ripe for judicial review, and
that plaintiff had not exhausted its administrative remedies. (There are numerous cases so holding — see, e.g.,
Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 79 L.Ed.
259, 55 S. Ct. 7; P. F. Peterson Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290
U.S. 570, 78 L. Ed. 505, 54 S. Ct. 277).
Another facet of this case bears on the equities of the
State's position. Eepresentatives of the plaintiff were
clearly lulled into a false sense of security. They assumed, and reasonably so, that the matter was still
pending before the Commission until July 11, 1969. At
no time did the Commission or its representatives indicate that the matter was final or that judicial review was
precluded. Under these circumstances, it hardly behooves
the State to seek a hypertechnical, hyperformal application of stringent time limits on appeal. Indeed, were
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the State not clothed with its "King can do no wrong"
aura, it should surely be estopped from asserting this
defense at all.
W

TP

T?

"R*

*5P

We submit, therefore, by way of cross assignment
of error, that Judge Hanson erred (a) in finding that
the appeal was not timely and (b) in applying a Begulation which was previously held to be invalid. Judge
Hanson did have appellate jurisdiction to hear the cause.
POINT II
THE ROAD COMMISSION HAD NO POWER WHATSOEVER TO REMOVE THE SIGN IN QUESTION.

A. Background of the Act
This case involves the so-called Highway Beautification Act. It requires but a brief look at the Utah statute (commencing Utah Code Annotated, §27-12-136.1) to
see that the "Utah Outdoor Advertising Act" is nothing
more or less than a response to the Federal Government
for legislation Indeed, the purpose of the Act as set
forth in Utah Code Annotated, §27-12-136.2 makes specific reference to "Title 23 of the United States Code" and
the "Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965." U.S.
Code references are also contained in the definitions
(27-12-136.3), the Congress of the United States and the
Secretary of Commerce are mentioned prominently in
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the minimum standards section (27-12-136.5), the Federal
Highway Beautification Act is again mentioned in 2712-136.6, indeed the power of the Highway Commission
is restricted by the "minimum national standards promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to Title 23 U.S. Code
(supra). The amazing thing is that although in response
to the Federal Government and in order to obtain highway funds, the State of Utah has enacted a complex maze
of legislative and regulatory provisions regarding highway beauty, placement of signs, junk yards etc., to our
knowledge not one nickel of funds has been appropriated
for the purpose of paying just compensation to anyone
whose sign is taken down. The Legislature must have
been apprehensive about this problem since in Section
27-12-136.11 it s p e ^ f l l y provided:
"Despite any contrary provision in this Act,
no sign shall be required to be removed unless at
the time of removal there are sufficient
funds,
from whatever source, appropriated and immediately available to this State with which to pay the
just compensation required under this
Section,
and unless at such time the Federal funds required to be contributed to this State under Section 131 of Title 23, United States Code, have been
appropriated and are immediately available to
this State." (Ephasis added.)
It is a well known fact which has been the subject
of substantial national publicity that no funds have been

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
appropriated under Section 131 of Title 23 for the State
of Utah. Indeed, Judge Hanson so found. (R. 83).
B.

The proceedings

below

Our first position in this case is, as set forth in
Point I, that Judge Hanson erred in determining that
our appeal was not timely and thus his decision has
the effect of reversing that of the Road Commission.
Should the Court determine that we did not timely
file our appeal, we submit that the thirty-day appeal
provision is inapplicable to our second cause of action
which attacks the Road Commission on broader grounds.
The Second Cause of Action (R. 3-4) is meant to challenge the constitutionality of any action on the p a r t of
the Highway Commission in interfering with or removing the sign in question. There is eminent and clearly
analogous authority to the effect that under these circumstances, a statute limiting time for appeal is inapplicable. In the case of Hadden vs. Aitken,

156 Neb. 215,

55 N.W. 2d 620, 35 ALR 2d 1003 (1952), a very similar
question was presented. The act in question in that
case, involving motor vehicle licenses, required the filing
of a Petition for Appeal within 60 days following the
receipt of an order. The plaintiff in the case failed to
comply with this provision and the Appellant, as here,
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sought to dismiss the case for failure to file a timely
Petition for Appeal. We quote from the pertinent part
of the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska:
"Appellants again raise their motion to dismiss the proceedings. This motion we have already denied. The basis for the motion is that
Appellee did not file his petition during the time
within which Section 60-503 BBS 1943, provides
that appeals must be taken. (Quoting statute).
"If this proceeding is an appeal from the
order of October 30, 1951, then it is out of time
and the motion should be sustained. (Citing
cases). However, we do not think the petition
was for the purpose of perfecting an appeal from
the order of October 30, 1951, but that it was
filed as an original action in equity seeking to
permanently enjoin the enforcement of the order
of October 30, 1951, on the grounds that the legislation is, in several respects, unconstitutional,,"
Therefore, the Court refused to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that it sought broader relief than merely
appeal — as here, it sought to permanently enjoin unconstitutional administrative action.
We believe this case constates sound precedent
which should be followed in this case in the event the
Court determines that we have not timely perfected our
appeal.
C.

The merits of the

controversy
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I t should be noted that Appellant really makes no
arguments concerning the merits of the controversy but
simply argues (in Point I of its Brief) that the Court
had no jurisdiction and (in Point I I of its Brief) that
procedural due process was granted to National Advertising Company through the hearing at the State Road
Commission.
This sterile approach really ignores the factual controversy in the case. The key point in controversy was
whether or not the State had issued a permit for the
construction of an American Oil sign at the quadrant
of 21st South and Redwood Road in Salt Lake County.
The Highway Commission originally held that no such
permit had been issued. As far as can be determined
from the rather cryptic record before the Road Commission, this finding was predicated upon the testimony
of one Mercer D. Smith who was the Permit Control
Officer for the State. There had originally been a smaller
sign reading for an insurance company on Redwood
Road. An application was timely filed to change this
sign structure into the new structure referred to as the
American Oil sign. (See R. 62). The new structure was
located in a different place, faced a different direction,
and was larger than the previous structure, and the
basic question is whether the permit which was granted
(R. 62), covered the new sign. Mercer D. Smith originally testified before the Road Commission that he did
not intend the permit to cover the new sign. His testimony was as follows:
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,

: "The permit, as far as I am concerned, was
for the smaller sign and not for this larger one
and my idea was to pivot the sign 90° and not
remove it now a distance between the initial sign
and this sign which is about 35 feet further to the
/North." (E. 47)

I t might be observed that this was a statement given
extemporaneously by Mr. Smith at the Eoad Commission
hearing — significantly, he was not cross examined. At
the time of the trial, the State presented Mr. Smith as
a witness.

On cross examination, his testimony was

much more elaborate as to just what was and what was
not intended by the permit which was granted:
"Q. So isn't it a fact, Mr. Smith, even based on
your own testimony, that when you issued
this permit you realized that the sign that
was to be constructed had the following differences from the previous sign. One is there
would be a 90-degree turn there?
"A. Eight. Eight.

,

;

"Q. And No. 2, it would be a larger sign?
"A. True.
"Q. True. Even tough the permit does not speak
in terms of a larger sign you knew that w^as
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what tthey were thinking about, and that was
what the permit covered?
"A. Right.
"Q. And No. 3, presumably there would have to
be additional pole structure to support the
larger sign?
"A. True.
"Q. And that is what you intended, is that correct,
Sir?
"A. For the same sign, yes.
"Q. And for that the sign would have to be
higher?
"A. Yes.
"Q. No question about that?
"A. No question/' (R .122-23)
It was on the basis of this clear evidence that Judge
Hanson ruled that the permit in fact covered the new
sign and therefore that the sign was lawful. In the
Court's Memorandum Decision (R. 79), the following
finding is found:
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"That-the permit given for the .erection of
the sign in question was valid and the construction of said sign was in conformance with the
intent and purpose of the permit."
Also significantly, Judge Hanson held that the new sign
was merely a "lawful continuation" of the previous sign.
(K, 83).
Since under the clear evidence the sign was lawful
and a permit had been granted, it follows that the sign
could not be removed without the payment of just compensation. (Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 27-12-136.11).
I t further follows that since the sign was merely a
lawful continuation of previously existing outdoor advertising, the statute itself precludes the removal of the
sign as follows:
"Any outdoor advertising lawfully in existence along the interstate or the primary systems
on the effective date of this Act and which is not
then in conformity with its provisions may not
be required to be removed until December 31,
1972, except for violation of Sec, 27-12-136.8 or
pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 27-12-136.11."
{Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 27-12-136.10).
Appellant does not question any of these principles
of law nor does it question the basic substantive merits
of Judge Hanson's rulings.
.• ; : .- x
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The only possible impropriety that might be raised
is that Judge Hanson took additional evidence, beyond
that which was received at the administrative hearing.
It is unclear whether Judge Hanson's decison was based
upon the evidence at the administrative hearing or that
which was taken at the time of trial, and we submit that
this ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Respondent under normal rules of appellate presumptions. However, and going further, it seems clear that since the
Court was looking to broad constitutional question, as
to whether the property rights of plaintiff could be
taken without just compensaion, the Court was certainly
justified in adducing additional evidence to clarify the
admittedly meager record from the administrative proceeding. There is substantial precedent to support such
actions. For example, in Denver & Bio Grande Western
Railroad Co., et al, vs. Central Weber Sewer Improvement District, 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955), this
Court observed:
"Ordinarily on writ of review the certified
record alone is examinable. Not so, however,
where the record and determination of the Commission or board are unsupported by some kind
of reasonably substantial proof. In such event the
judiciary may awaken to question their warrant,
and in doing so, may receive, examine and weigh
evidence, if necssary, as it did here on stipulated facts, to the end that due process guarantees will maintain." (Citing numerous cases).
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Likewise, the Supreme Court of the United States
in an early decision in Swing vs. City of St. Louis, 104
U.S. 630, 18 L.Ed. 657 (1866), stated as follows:
"With the proceedings and determinations of
inferior boards or tribunals of special jurisdictions, courts of equity will not interfere, unless
it should become necssary to prevent a multiplicity of suits or irreparable injury, or unless the
proceedings sought to be annulled or corrected is
valid upon its face, and the alleged invalidity
consists in matters to be established by extrinsic
evidence."
Our point is simple. When matters of constitutional
significance are involved such as the taking of private
property without just compensation, a court of equity
has inherent jurisdiction to take additional facts in order
to determine the true merits of the controversy.
Moreover, the key testimony was the testimony of
Mercer D. Smith on cross examination at the time of the
trial. The State put Mr. Smith on the stand (E, 117)
and elicited direct testimony from him. Therefore, the
State is precluded from objecting to testimony elicited
through the cross examination of Mr. Smith and the
same was properly before the Court.
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CONCLUSION
We wish to stress that we are dealing here with
property rights of a very substantial nature. The sign
in question is placed upon real property for which Nation Advertising pays a rental. It also receives a rental
from American Oil Company for the advertising structure in question. Judge Hanson found and it is not
disputed that National Advertising has had advertising
structures continuously in this same geographical location for several months preceding the effective date of
the Highway Beautifaction Act. The State is here seeking to remove such sign and to deprive National Advertising of the revenues which are derived from the sign.
Where private property is thus at stake, the full force
of the due process clause of Amendment 14 to the United
States Constitution and Article 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah
State Constitution must be brought to bear. The State
should not be allowed to rely upon intricacies of appellate time limits or other hypertechnical rules. Rather,
the State should be prepared to meet, in substance, the
demand that the sign in question was a lawful sign and
its removal must be accompanied by the payment of just
compensation. Since the State is clearly unable and
unwilling to pay just compensation, the removal of the
sign would be unconstitutional. In substance, there is
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no question but that the sign should remain where it is.
Judge Hanson has so held and it is respectfully submited that he should be sustained.

Gordon L. Roberts
of and for

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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